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RE-READING CHEVRON
THOMAS W. MERRILL†
ABSTRACT
Though increasingly disfavored by the Supreme Court, Chevron
remains central to administrative law doctrine. This Article suggests a
way for the Court to reformulate the Chevron doctrine without
overruling the Chevron decision. Through careful attention to the
language of Chevron itself, the Court can honor the decision’s
underlying value of harnessing comparative institutional advantage in
judicial review, while setting aside a highly selective reading that unduly
narrows judicial review. This re-reading would put the Chevron
doctrine—and with it, an entire branch of administrative law—on
firmer footing.
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INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 is,
if not the most important decision in administrative law, certainly the
most cited.2 It is also one of the most criticized. Academic grousing is
one thing, but Chevron seems also to have lost favor with the Supreme
Court. The Justices generally identified as conservative—some of
them, anyway—appear willing to overrule or at least limit the decision,
with principles of stare decisis temporizing their willingness to varying
extents. The Justices generally identified as liberal are presumably
more supportive, although they are reluctant to invoke Chevron for
fear of what the conservatives might do in response. These calculations
are complicated by the addition of the newest member of the Court,
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who has yet to be heard from on Chevron.
The result, for now, is a kind of paralysis on the Court with respect to
the status of Chevron. The Court has not relied on the Chevron
doctrine to uphold an agency interpretation of law for four years.3 The
obvious evasion has prompted Justice Samuel Alito to remark that
“the Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron,” which he
characterized as “an important, frequently invoked, once celebrated,
and now increasingly maligned precedent.”4
The Court cannot ignore Chevron forever. The decision is far too
central to administrative law. Agencies, lower courts, and lawyers need
guidance about its status. This Article suggests how the Court might
reformulate the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron
decision. That move requires distinguishing between the doctrine and
the decision. This Article argues they are not the same. The Chevron
decision should be allowed to stand; indeed, it can be upheld as an
instructive example of how judges should review agency
interpretations of the statutes they administer. The Chevron doctrine,
in contrast, is based on two paragraphs in the Chevron decision, taking

1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 n.2 (2014).
3. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136, 2142 (2016) (relying on
Chevron to uphold an interpretation of the Patent Office about the scope of construction of
patents on inter partes review).
4. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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those paragraphs out of context and elevating them into a mechanical
doctrine that fails to reflect the broader traditions of administrative
law.5 By reading the Chevron decision as a whole, the “increasingly
maligned” doctrine can be recast in a way that is more faithful to the
values of judicial review and puts this branch of administrative law on
sounder footing.
This Article will not appeal to those who would abolish all
deference to agency interpretations of law, insisting that only Article
III courts are entitled to “say what the law is.”6 Nor will it appeal to
those who believe the modern pace of social change requires that
agencies replace Congress and the courts as the primary sources of
legal norms.7 It embraces the notion that judicial review of agency legal
interpretations should be structured in such a way as to emphasize the
comparative strengths of both courts and agencies as institutions.
Broadly speaking, it assumes that courts have a comparative advantage
in enforcing the rule of law and constitutional values, and that agencies
have a comparative advantage in reconciling conflicting policy
objectives.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sketches four values
that should be advanced by a regime that divides authority to interpret
the law between agencies and courts. Part II considers the Supreme
Court’s unanimous Chevron decision and demonstrates that most of
the decision is highly consistent with the four values identified in Part
I. Part III turns to two paragraphs that appear in an introductory
section of the Chevron opinion, and argues that these paragraphs, at
least as they came to be interpreted, are significantly at odds with these
values. Part IV then offers some thoughts about how the Court could
revise the Chevron doctrine by returning to the Chevron decision and
reaffirming it, as it stands in its entirety, as the proper foundation for a
system of judicial review.

5. Infra Parts I.E. & III.
6. E.g., PETER J. WALLISON, JUDICIAL FORTITUDE: THE LAST CHANCE TO REIN IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE x (2018). The quoted reference is from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803): “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”
7. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2–3 (2016) (arguing that only agencies have the capacity to respond in
a timely and informed manner to unanticipated social crises).
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I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FOUR VALUES
Judicial review of questions of law performs multiple functions.
This Part offers a brief sketch of four values widely regarded as being
important in the context of judicial review of statutory interpretations
by administrative agencies—the process to which the Chevron doctrine
speaks.8
A. Rule-of-Law Values
Because we are considering the interpretation of law, it makes
sense that the regime of judicial review should promote the rule of law.
The concept of the “rule of law” has multiple meanings.9 At its core, it
refers to the benefit of having stable expectations about what the law
requires, both in terms of what individuals are allowed to do and what
the government is allowed to do in its interactions with individuals.
Stability of expectations is good because it makes life more predictable.
Predictability is good because it promotes security, makes planning for
the future possible, encourages investment, and gives individuals the
freedom to pursue their aspirations within the space established by
these stable expectations.10
One extremely important set of settled expectations is the
understanding that American law is defined by a hierarchy of legal
authority. At the top sits the Constitution, below that are the many
statutes that have been enacted by Congress, and below that are the
even more numerous regulations and orders issued by administrative
agencies. The Constitution trumps statutes, and statutes trump agency
regulations and orders. This understanding is not set forth in any
foundational document. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause speaks
of both the Constitution and federal statutes as the “supreme Law of
the Land” without differentiating between them and, further, makes
no mention of agency regulations and orders.11 The hierarchy of legal

8. The four values are discussed at greater length in THOMAS W. MERRILL, TO SAY WHAT
LAW IS: THE SUPREME COURT’S CHEVRON DOCTRINE AND THE FUTURE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at ch. 1) (on file with the Author).
9. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?,
21 LAW & PHIL. 137–40 (2002) (noting that the common usage of the term “rule of law” diverges
from its technical and philosophical meaning and that, from its inception, there has been little
consensus around the term’s meaning).
10. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969) (summarizing
the virtues of the rule of law); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW 210, 220 (2d ed. 2009) (similar).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.

THE
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authority is grounded in settled expectations about how the American
legal order is organized.
It is important to note that the rule of law—in the sense of stability
of expectations about the law—is not the only value society should
promote. It is possible to imagine a society that scrupulously observes
the rule of law and yet is pervasively racist, highly inefficient, or
generates large inequalities in wealth. The fact that rule-of-law values
can coexist with injustice and other unfavorable conditions means that
stability of expectations should, on appropriate occasions, give way to
legal change. The question is whether judicial review can help strike a
proper balance between stability of expectations and accommodating
desired change in the law.
Here, a notable difference between agencies and courts becomes
relevant. Courts by their very nature are designed to reinforce stability
of expectations. The primary function of courts is to resolve disputes.
The very legitimacy of courts in performing this function is the
perception of the parties that the norms courts invoke in resolving
these disputes are grounded in existing law.12 Moreover, courts by
institutional design are independent of direct political control. Federal
judges enjoy secure compensation and can be removed from office only
by impeachment.13 This high degree of independence is thought to
encourage judges to resolve disputes according to settled law, rather
than according to the preferences of the incumbent president or
members of Congress.
When it comes to statutory interpretation, courts nearly always
seek to determine the best or, at least, the settled meaning of the
relevant statute. In other words, they seek the meaning that other
participants in the legal system, as advised by their lawyers, most likely
understand to be the law. Courts—as a rule—understand that it is the
legislature’s job to make policy and the court’s job to serve as a faithful
agent carrying out the instructions of the legislature. Courts are also
far more likely to adhere to settled expectations when extrapolating
from prior precedent to resolve a new question.14 In any area of law
12. Thomas W. Merrill, Legitimate Interpretation—Or Legitimate Adjudication?, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 1395, 1407–08 (2020).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
14. Vertical stare decisis in the federal system is generally understood to be quite strong.
See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921
(2016) (citing authorities supporting the strict rule of vertical stare decisis and discussing examples
of lower courts narrowing or extending Supreme Court precedent). Horizontal stare decisis is
considered less strong, but nonetheless the Court frequently adheres to a presumption against
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that is largely governed by precedent, the courts’ authority to compel
obedience from the parties is, in significant part, driven by the sense
that they adhere to precedents authoritatively rendered in the past.
Courts occasionally overrule precedents. More commonly, they
narrow or expand on them. But they almost never disregard a
controlling precedent that has been called to their attention.
Agencies present a much less reassuring picture when it comes to
enforcing settled expectations about the law. Some agencies, like the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), use the dispute-resolution
function to make policy, which often results in ideological shifts from
one administration to the next, oscillating between pro-labor and promanagement perspectives.15 Similarly, other agencies that use
rulemaking to make policy, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), frequently make dramatic policy turns when one
presidential administration is replaced by another. The alternating
position of the EPA with respect to climate change policy from the
Bush II administration to the Obama administration to the Trump
administration is a recent example.16
If protecting settled expectations were the only value to be served
by judicial review, one would generally expect a large dose of
interpretive authority to be allocated to courts rather than agencies.
One way this can come into play is when consistent agency action has
given rise to settled expectations. In these circumstances, rule-of-law
values suggest that courts should give added weight to the agency’s
view of the law, even if the agency’s interpretation diverges from what

overruling. See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547,
581–83 (2018) (discussing that, in interpreting constitutional law, “the Supreme Court will give
pride of place to its own precedents in order to cultivate an appearance of legality and reinforce
its reputation for adherence to its own prior judgments”). The importance of adhering to
controlling precedent was common ground among the Justices in a recent wide-ranging debate
about whether it is more important to adhere to the ratio decidendi of a precedent or to the
outcome reached by a precedent. Compare Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1404 (2020)
(arguing that the ratio decidendi is what matters), with id. at 1429–30 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the outcome is what matters).
15. See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking,
37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 171 (1985) (noting that “[t]he [NLRB’s] behavior—abrupt changes in
policy appearing to rework in wholesale major areas of Board law, often undone three or four
years later—sows disrespect for the agency,” resulting in “courts [being] reluctant to pay little
more than lip service to the doctrine of deference to agency policymaking . . . given the agency’s
apparently cavalier view of its own established rules”).
16. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis,
70 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1114–36 (2021) (discussing several environmental policy reversals by the
Trump EPA).
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the court considers to be the best reading of the statute. Another way
it can come into play is when agencies change course in a way that is
likely to upset the expectations created by prior agency action. When
this happens, reviewing courts should demand a persuasive
explanation from the agency as to why frustrating expectations is
justified in terms of competing policy objectives.17
There is another institutional distinction between courts and
agencies that is relevant to rule-of-law values. A central theme of the
literature analyzing rule-of-law values is that persons are entitled to
fair notice about the requirements of the law.18 This in turn means that
changes in the law should ordinarily apply only to future conduct.
Making legal change prospective allows those affected by the change
to adjust their expectations and behavior to avoid coming into conflict
with the law.
The strong preference for making changes in law prospective is
relevant to the comparison of how courts and agencies function. Courts
nearly always engage in dispute resolution by applying the law to
behavior that has already taken place. This means judicial decisions are
by their nature retroactive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that
federal courts may not resolve a dispute by entering a judgment that
applies only prospectively.19 Agencies, in contrast, typically have a
wider array of tools they can use to constrain behavior. Most agencies
have the power to issue rules of various kinds, which always apply
prospectively unless Congress has conveyed special authority to the
agency to make them retroactive—which is rare.20 These rules include
nonbinding statements of policy or interpretation that inform the
public about how an agency intends to regulate in the future. So
agencies, unlike courts, have the power to make changes in the law
17. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (declining to
give weight to an agency’s regulation because it “was issued without the reasoned explanation
that was required in light of the Department[ of Labor]’s change in position and the significant
reliance interests involved”).
18. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 217 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This
decision is an ominous one to those who believe that men should be governed by laws that they
may ascertain and abide by . . . .”).
19. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a
rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule . . . must be given full retroactive effect in all
cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or
postdate our announcement of the rule.” (emphasis added)).
20. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[A] statutory grant
of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express
terms.”).
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prospective, which is the way changes should be made if protecting
settled expectations is important because of reliance interests.
In short, reviewing courts should give added weight to agency
interpretations that conform to settled expectations and should
subtract weight—or demand an explanation—for interpretations that
frustrate settled expectations. They should also, if possible, encourage
agencies to make changes in the law prospective.
B. Constitutional Values
As administrative governance grows, it inevitably comes into
conflict with values that have been identified as constitutional. Here,
the division of authority between courts and agencies is settled. By
convention, the courts, most notably the Supreme Court, have final
authority to determine constitutional meaning, and other
governmental actors are duty-bound to accept the decisions issued by
the courts in the name of the Constitution.21
In considering the role of constitutional values, individual
constitutional rights and federalism principles are obviously important,
and courts are expected to enforce these limits on the scope of agency
authority. Separation of powers principles are even more pervasively
relevant in considering judicial review of questions of law. Here, the
crux is preserving the constitutional role of Congress in our system of
government. The Constitution has always been understood to establish
the principle of legislative supremacy. What this means is that duly
enacted legislation is a higher form of legal authority than any
regulation or order issued by an administrative agency or any executive
order issued by the president. All agree that if there is a direct and
unambiguous conflict between what a statute says and either what an
agency does by regulation or order or what the president does by
executive order, the statute prevails. There is nevertheless a latent
ambiguity about the meaning of legislative supremacy. There are three
possible ways of unpacking what it means that Congress’s legislative
power is supreme relative to regulations and orders issued by
administrative agencies or executive orders issued by the president.22
21. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (noting the longstanding historical debate between
the “departmentalist” and “judicial supremacy” positions and endorsing the emerging consensus
in favor of the judicial supremacy conception as promoting a “settlement function”).
22. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2117–18 (2004) (detailing the three conceptions based on
different readings of the Constitution).
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One possibility is that legislative supremacy means the
Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to set policy in a
legally binding fashion. This is the understanding associated with the
so-called nondelegation doctrine. The Constitution gives “[a]ll
legislative [p]owers” to Congress23 and, therefore, under this
conception of supremacy, the sharing of such power is impermissible.
Agencies may be charged with enforcing or implementing the law as
established by Congress, but they cannot be given the power to make
legally binding policy.
A second possibility is that the Constitution gives Congress the
exclusive power, if it does not set policy itself, to delegate to another
institution, such as an agency, the power to set policy in a legally
binding fashion. This is the anti-inherency understanding. Given the
allocation of all legislative power to Congress, administrative
agencies—and for that matter the president and the courts—have no
inherent authority to “make law” that binds the public. They must
derive their authority to set policy from some form of enacted law—
either a specific provision of the Constitution or, more typically, a
statute enacted by Congress.
The third possibility is that the Constitution gives Congress the last
word in determining legally binding policy. Under this understanding,
Congress always has the power to override legally binding policy
established by the president or an agency. But if Congress is silent,
executive and judicial entities have the authority to make legally
binding policy in areas where the federal government as a whole is
competent to act. In other words, administrative agencies and the
president have inherent authority to act in default of Congress, but
must conform to any limitations adopted by Congress that limit this
discretion.24
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the antiinherency interpretation has the strongest claim to being the dominant
conception of legislative supremacy today. There are, to be sure,
relatively few explicit statements of this understanding from the
Supreme Court in cases involving a direct clash between Congress and
the president. The most famous is Justice Hugo Black’s opinion in
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
24. Lest the “last word” conception be regarded as fanciful, it should be noted that this is
the understanding that has sometimes been adopted by the Supreme Court in authorizing courts
to employ federal common law to resolve particular disputes that implicate “federal interests.”
For further discussion, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327,
329–31 (1992).
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case),25
which invalidated President Harry Truman’s effort to nationalize steel
mills threatened by a labor shutdown in the midst of the Korean War.26
Justice Black said flatly that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue
the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.”27 But the precedential value of this statement was
compromised by various concurring opinions, which left the door open
to recognizing some inherent presidential power to act in certain
circumstances.28 Where administrative agencies are concerned and the
question is limited to domestic policy, there are many more statements
from the Supreme Court adopting the anti-inherency position.29
More impressive than occasional statements by the Court,
however, is the consistent practice of both the executive branch and
the judiciary over time. Presidents have consistently acknowledged
that they have no authority to create new departments or agencies
without the authorization of Congress. Agencies have uniformly
recognized the need to ground their authority to act in some statutory
authority conferred on them by Congress. And courts have repeatedly
exercised their power of judicial review to invalidate agency action
perceived as going beyond what Congress has authorized, or as
transgressing some limitation imposed by statute. Judging by settled
expectations based on actual practice, the anti-inherency position has
evolved to become the dominant understanding of the meaning of
legislative supremacy.30
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
26. Id. at 587.
27. Id. at 585.
28. The most famous being the concurrence of Justice Robert Jackson, who posited a “zone
of twilight” where the president asserts his own authority without Congress having spoken on the
issue. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
29. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) (“[R]ulemaking power
originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by
the Legislature to the Executive Branch.”); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress
confers power upon it.”); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative
power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority
by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the
Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes.”).
30. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 61 (1993) (concluding, based on a wide-ranging review of the relevant history, that
“[o]ur tradition is that no official—from the President down—can invade private rights unless
authorized by legislation”).
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The anti-inherency interpretation of legislative supremacy,
assuming it is the established understanding, has important
implications for judicial review of agency interpretations of law. Under
this view, administrative agencies have no authority to act unless and
until they have been delegated such authority by Congress, and their
authority to act is limited to whatever powers Congress has in fact
granted.31 Congress, in other words, is uniquely endowed with the
power to decide who decides.32 This has important implications for
judicial review. The anti-inherency postulate is a critical axiom in our
evolved understanding of the separation of powers. Courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, should therefore enforce the limitations
Congress has placed on the authority of agencies in order to preserve
the principle that Congress has the exclusive prerogative to establish
agencies and delineate their powers and limits.
The anti-inherency principle, as a postulate of constitutional law,
is largely invisible to modern lawyers and judges. This is because it has
been subsumed in the nearly universal practice of providing for a right
of judicial review when challenging the legality of agency action. From
roughly the 1920s to the present, the established device for monitoring
agency compliance with the scope of its delegated authority has been
judicial review of final agency action. When Congress creates a federal
agency and gives it delegated powers, Congress also provides for
judicial review of the agency’s decisions on behalf of persons aggrieved
by final agency action. If an aggrieved person claims that the agency
exceeded the scope of its delegated power, the reviewing court will
interpret the scope of the agency’s delegated power, and if it agrees
that the agency has exceeded its authority, it sets aside the agency
action as unlawful.33 Except in unusual cases, the reviewing court will
make no reference to the separation of powers premise underlying this
mode of review—the need to protect the superior power of Congress

31. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000)
(“Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, courts hold that federal
administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until Congress has
expressly authorized them to do so.”).
32. Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
454 & n.12 (2010).
33. This understanding was expressly codified in the Administrative Procedure Act,
adopted in 1946. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (reviewing court is to decide all questions of law); id.
§ 706(2)(C) (reviewing court shall set aside agency action “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”).
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to create an agency and delimit the scope of its delegated powers.34
There has been no need to elevate the issue to the level of
constitutional principle because it has been sufficient to invalidate the
agency action as contrary to the statute creating its delegated powers.
The constitutional principle has remained submerged because
Congress has routinely provided for judicial review, implicitly
recognizing that such review is the only realistic device available to it
for assuring that its intentions about the scope of power it has
delegated to an agency will be enforced.35
Thus, although the principle of legislative supremacy is ultimately
grounded in separation of powers principles, this does not mean that
agency action that exceeds the scope of its delegated authority should
be held unconstitutional. It is almost never necessary to reach such a
judgment.36 What is necessary—and required by the anti-inherency
principle—is that courts engage in careful review to determine that
agencies (and, as appropriate, the president) have stayed within the
boundaries of their authority as established by duly enacted legislation.
The practice of careful review by courts in this context is required by
the Constitution, even if every exercise of authority by an agency that
is ultra vires need not be characterized as unconstitutional.37 It is not

34. One such unusual case was Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
The Court invalidated an EPA regulation that interpreted a statutory provision specifying “250
tons” of air pollutant to mean “100,000 tons” in the context of emissions of carbon dioxide. Id. at
325. The Court observed that allowing such an interpretation to stand would “deal a severe blow
to the Constitution’s separation of powers.” Id. at 327.
35. The APA recognized that Congress could explicitly or implicitly make agency action
unreviewable. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). But Congress has rarely done so where important private rights
are at stake, and the Court has interpreted the APA as creating a broad presumption in favor of
judicial review. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567–69 (2019) (holding
that the secretary of commerce’s broad authority under the Census Act does not preclude judicial
review under the APA); Abbott Labs. v. Gardiner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (holding that the
APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review”).
36. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) (“Our cases do not support the
proposition that every action by the President, or by another executive official, in excess of his
statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution.”).
37. This proposition seems to suggest that some form of judicial review assuring that
agencies act within the scope of their authority is required by the Constitution. For some of the
difficulties in sustaining such an argument, see Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and Judicial
Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 79–85 (2010). As long as Congress is still interested in
preserving its constitutional prerogative to decide who decides, one can assume Congress will
continue to provide for judicial review of agency action in order to hold the executive in check. If
Congress decides to acquiesce in allowing the executive branch to become the primary source of
policy initiatives, Congress may lose interest in assuring that judicial review is available.
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necessary to do so, given that every exercise of authority that is ultra
vires is for that reason unlawful.
C. Accountability Values
So far, the discussion has pointed toward the importance of courts
exercising autonomous judgment in reviewing agency interpretations
of law. A third set of values—the importance of having discretionary
policy decisions made by politically accountable institutions—turns the
balance decisively in favor of agencies.
How should courts proceed when the question of interpretation
falls comfortably within the boundaries of the agency’s discretionary
authority and does not implicate the importance of settled legal
expectations? We can reframe the question as follows: As between the
agency and the reviewing court, which institution has a comparative
advantage in resolving matters of discretionary interpretive choice?
When rule-of-law values and constitutional values are excluded, it
becomes clear that the agency should resolve matters of discretionary
interpretive choice. Such choices commonly present trade-offs
between competing values. Do we want safer drugs or faster access to
medical innovations? Less pollution or more economic growth? Fewer
accidents or more affordable products? Resolving these trade-offs
entails decisions that are essentially political. Many would argue that
such decisions should be made by the people’s elected
representatives.38 This is seemingly what the Constitution
contemplates, given that the document says that all legislative powers
are given to Congress. And indeed, Congress often resolves them by
enacting statutes that adopt highly precise answers to questions of
public policy.39
But Congress and the president—who participates in the
legislative process in proposing legislation and exercising the veto—are
severely constrained in their capacities to resolve even a fraction of the
matters of discretionary interpretive choice that arise. This is especially
true in the modern world, with its rapid rate of technological,
38. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 130–36 (1980) (arguing that it is “undemocratic” for the legislature to delegate hard
issues to “some executive-branch bureaucrat, or perhaps some independent regulatory
commission,” in order to avoid “the inevitable political heat”).
39. Modern legislation increasingly takes the form of extremely lengthy enactments that
contain a combination of highly specific provisions intermixed with general or ambiguous
directives. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016) (providing illustrations).
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economic, and social change.40 Therefore, out of necessity, Congress
and the president, both acting through the legislative process, have
created administrative agencies to address these issues. Of course, as
previously discussed, Congress also sets limits on the authority of these
agencies, and provides for judicial review to assure that they are
respected.
Resolving matters of discretionary interpretive choice in a way
that is responsive to the collective wishes of the people presents a kind
of second-best choice in most circumstances: Should such issues be
decided by agencies or courts? Neither institution is directly
accountable to the people. Unlike the members of Congress and the
president, the heads of agencies and federal judges do not stand for
periodic election. Both the heads of agencies and judges are nominated
by the president and subject to confirmation by the Senate, which gives
each a measure of indirect accountability. But whereas agency heads
turn over fairly frequently—usually at the end of each four-year
presidential term at minimum41—judges can potentially serve for life.
So, agency heads are more likely to have received the assent of the
current elected representatives of the people—the president and the
Senate—as compared to judges, many of whom ascended to the bench
decades ago.
Political scientists also point out that agencies are subject to a
number of constraints that make them more accountable to elected
politicians than judges.42 Agencies depend on Congress for their
appropriations, which means the heads of agencies must attend closely
to the wishes of appropriations committees.43 High-level agency
personnel also appear periodically before congressional oversight
committees, which can expose embarrassing missteps and extract
commitments about future action.44 Under current practice, agency

40. See generally WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL
ACCELERATION OF TIME (2004) (examining the effect that the fast pace of modern society has
on liberal democracies).
41. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 69 (1995) (noting that the average tenure of a political
appointee in the executive branch is roughly two years).
42. See, e.g., Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in
a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120, 163 (1996).
43. For a general discussion of sources of congressional control, see Jack M. Beermann,
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64, 68 (2006) (concluding that
“Congress is deeply involved in the day to day administration of the law”).
44. Hammond & Knott, supra note 42, at 123–27.
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budget requests are also screened by the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”), a White House agency, which means the heads of
agencies must attend to the wishes of the president.45 And political
appointees of agencies are subject to removal from office by the
president, either at will or indirectly through various forms of pressure.
Lastly, again as a matter of current practice, agency rules that exceed a
certain minimum (for example, $100 million in annual effect on the
economy) are subject to review by another office of the OMB, the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which again gives the
White House a measure of control over agency policy choices.46 There
is nothing comparable in terms of oversight of federal judges.
In short, if interpretations involving discretionary policy choice
should be made by the more accountable decisionmaker, agencies win
over courts hands down.47
Focusing on accountability does not disregard a second reason to
prefer agencies over courts in resolving open discretionary issues—
namely, the greater expertise of agencies in matters of public policy.
Recognizing that agencies are inevitably political does not mean that
agency expertise will be ignored. The early proponents of
administrative government—the Progressives and their intellectual
heirs—characterized administrative agencies as scientific, neutral,
apolitical entities, and juxtaposed them with crude actors like big-city
political machines.48 In other words, expertise was seen as incompatible
with accountability. But time has revealed this to be a false dichotomy.
45. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125
YALE L.J. 2182, 2203–04 (2016) (noting how the OMB’s ability to control agencies’ spending
influences the agencies’ policy decisions).
46. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) (discussing the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs). For sources of presidential control over agencies, see generally Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). Then-Professor Kagan concluded
that “the most important [extrajudicial] development in the last two decades in administrative
process, and a development that also has important implications for administrative
substance[,] . . . is the presidentialization of administration—the emergence of enhanced methods
of presidential control over the regulatory state.” Id. at 2383.
47. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (“Strangely enough it may make sense to imagine
the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness
of government to the desires of the electorate.”).
48. For the social background, values, and attitudes of the Progressives, see generally
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 131–73 (1955). For a
portrait of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a leading advocate of regulatory reform during this era,
see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 1–57 (1984).
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Public opinion will demand that certain decisions be made by those
with the requisite skill and experience to make them correctly—or at
least those more likely than political appointees or courts to make them
correctly. Consider decisions like how to respond to a pandemic, how
to determine whether nuclear reactors have been safely designed and
operated, or how to fix the money supply to provide the proper balance
between inflation and employment. The public generally does not want
these sorts of decisions made by White House operatives or by
judges—they want someone with specific expertise. And because of
this, politicians will also prefer that these decisions be made by
agencies with the requisite degree of relevant expertise. Therefore, in
structuring judicial review to assure that discretionary interpretive
choices are made by politically accountable agencies, the courts will
indirectly assure that decisions that should be made by experts are
made with significant input from experts.
Readers familiar with the literature on judicial review will
perceive a potentially serious problem in differentiating between
questions that fall outside the boundaries of agency authority and those
that fall inside those boundaries. In a fateful decision, Justice Antonin
Scalia attacked the concept of “agency jurisdiction” as a “mirage,” an
“empty distraction,” and a “bogeyman.”49 This was rhetorical overkill,
as revealed by the fact that he was able to identify a number of
Supreme Court decisions that implicated the scope of agency
jurisdiction, demonstrating that the distinction is not meaningless.50 He
also conceded that courts have long differentiated between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions in determining their own
authority, suggesting that the distinction is conceptually meaningful.51
In practice, the boundaries of agency authority will often be easier
to discern than it may seem from considering the matter in the abstract.
Once again, settled expectations are highly relevant. The scope of
agency authority is rarely a matter of reading the words of a statute in
a vacuum. When an agency is first created, the principal officers of the
agency will nearly always have a clear appreciation of the functions that
Congress and the president expect the agency will perform. The initial
actions of the agency will reflect this shared understanding. If Congress
and the president do not react negatively, this will provide a further
signal to agency heads that they have understood their charge
49.
50.
51.

City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297, 300, 304 (2013).
Id. at 300–04.
See id. at 297.
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correctly. Over time, the functions of the agency may evolve, in
response to problems not foreseen when the initial legislation was
enacted. The agency may amend its understanding of its mandate in
light of these new problems. Again, if Congress and the president
acquiesce, this would provide a signal of approval. All along, the
agency’s actions may result in periodic review by the courts, and if the
courts accept the agency’s understanding of its authority, this will
provide further confirmation that the agency has correctly understood
the scope of its authority. The essential point is that, at any given time,
the scope of the agency’s authority will be governed not just by the
words of the statute, but by settled expectations, which evolve in an
incremental fashion. Deviations from these expectations are usually
easy to spot.52
In any event, even assuming that Justice Scalia was right that the
line between the scope of agency authority and the exercise of
authority will sometimes be disputable, it does not follow that every
difficult question about the scope of authority should be left up to the
agency to decide. This would mean largely giving up on judicial
enforcement of constitutional values like legislative supremacy. The
better position is that any provision of enacted law that limits the
discretion of an agency is a “boundary,” and hence the interpretation
of such a constraint must be resolved by the courts. This does not mean
courts should ignore an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its
authority. Courts should give respectful consideration to the agency’s
view; and if that view is consistent with settled expectations, it deserves
additional weight. The risk of error in these circumstances is reduced
by the use of such an intermediate standard of review, as opposed to
de novo review. And, of course, erroneous judicial decisions about the
scope of agency authority can always be corrected by Congress.
D. Process Values
A final value to be considered is whether judicial review can be
structured in such a way as to improve the quality of agency statutory
interpretations. Once again, we are considering matters of
discretionary interpretive choice. If an agency is not frustrating settled
expectations and is acting within the boundaries of its delegated

52. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143–59 (2000)
(detailing a long history of agency disclaimers of authority and congressional responses to show
that a general understanding had developed that the FDA had no authority to regulate tobacco
products).
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authority, courts should generally accept an agency’s interpretation of
the statute it enforces. But perhaps judicial review can be formulated
so as to increase the odds that agencies will make good statutory
interpretation decisions.
For much of the run-up to Chevron, courts differentiated between
“good” and “not so good” agency interpretations by asking whether
the agency interpretation was “reasonable.”53 Very little, if any,
progress has been made by courts in refining what this means, either
before or after Chevron. Particularly, it has never been clear whether
“reasonable” means reasonable as judged by the traditional tools of
interpretation used by courts, reasonable in terms of the policy result
that the agency seeks to advance by its interpretation, or reasonable in
terms of the process the agency followed in reaching its interpretation.
The first meaning—reasonable as a matter of legal interpretation
adopting judicial standards of interpretation—seems to require that
the agency follow the same decisional process that the courts follow.
This requires a duplication of effort by the agency and the court, which
makes little sense from the perspective of trying to identify the
comparative advantage of each institution. In theory, one can imagine
a regime in which reviewing courts exercise great self-restraint by
cabining their exercise of interpretation to a narrow, “clause-bound”
examination of statutory text, and then ask whether the agency
interpretation is “reasonable” in light of a broader range of variables
like statutory structure, purpose, and legislative history. In the
comparatively small number of cases that invalidate agency
interpretations under Step Two of the Chevron doctrine, a number of
appeals courts have interpreted “reasonable” in this fashion.54 In the
larger scheme of things, this is unrealistic. Once courts are told to
engage in de novo review of the question of interpretation, and to do
so armed with all the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, it is
inevitable that the judicial inquiry will expand into a full-scale judicial
exposition of the court’s understanding of the statute’s best meaning.
Once this happens, asking whether the agency interpretation is
“reasonable” becomes a foregone conclusion in nearly all cases—as a
matter of psychology, if not logic.55 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not
53. See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
54. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1441, 1451–54 (2018).
55. As then-Judge Stephen Breyer remarked in an early critique of the Chevron doctrine:
“It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it
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hold an agency interpretation “unreasonable” under Step Two of the
Chevron doctrine until 1999, and has done so on only three occasions
overall.56
The second meaning—reasonable as a matter of policy—seems to
invite courts to substitute their judgment for the agency’s as to the
wisdom of the policy being pursued. This is inconsistent with the fact
that Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make policy
judgments, not the courts.
The third possibility—reasonable as a matter of the process
followed in reaching the interpretation—seems to hold the most
promise for constructive judicial intervention designed to encourage
better agency interpretations without constraining the agency’s
exercise of delegated authority. Fortunately, courts have developed a
model for reviewing the process agencies follow in the context of
judicial review of agency policy choices adopted through rulemaking.
Ever since the 1970s, reviewing courts have sought to discipline agency
exercises of policymaking in this context by imposing a norm of
reasoned decisionmaking as a condition of upholding agency policies.57
This is sometimes called “hard look” review, meaning the reviewing
court must assure that the agency has taken a hard look at its various
policy options before it acts. Assuming that questions of discretionary
interpretive choice are at least analogous to policymaking, arguably the
same or similar norm of reasoned decisionmaking should be required
by courts as a condition of accepting an agency’s interpretation. A
better name for this form of judicial review is “process review,” in

correctly, to believe both that the agency’s interpretation is legally wrong, and that its
interpretation is reasonable.” Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986).
56. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 759–60 (2015); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S.
302, 325–28 (2014); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999). All three decisions,
not coincidentally, were authored by Justice Scalia, who concluded late in his judicial career that
the only relevant question to ask is whether an agency interpretation is “reasonable.” See United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
57. For early examples, see, for example, Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir.
1973). This norm of reasoned decisionmaking is generally regarded as having been endorsed in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29,
48–51 (1983) (holding that plausible alternatives to an agency’s proposed course of action must
be addressed and adequate reasons given for their rejection).
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order to avoid confusing it with the ambiguous requirement of
“reasonableness.”58
The norm of process review, as applied to statutory interpretation,
is relatively easy to state in the abstract. The norm requires that the
agency: (1) consider plausible alternatives and significant objections to
its proposed interpretation of the statute; (2) explain why its
interpretation falls within the scope of its delegated authority and
summarize the considerations of policy that support its choice; and (3)
provide an explanation for either accepting or rejecting plausible
alternatives or significant objections to its authority or its preferred
interpretation before finally adopting it.59
The argument for why process review might increase the odds of
agencies making better interpretations is straightforward. If conducted
in good faith, process review should be compatible with a variety of
outcomes and thus does not carry the implication that the reviewing
court is a kind of censor with the power to veto policies with which it
disagrees. Under the process-review norm, agencies are likely to
engage in more careful deliberation about the relevant issues presented
by any proposed interpretation before it is adopted. The agency may
come to recognize that the proposed interpretation interferes too much
with existing reliance interests or is inconsistent with aspects of its
statutory mandate. Or it may conclude that the proposed
interpretation is overly broad and should be cut back, or is
underinclusive and should be expanded. The need to consider
objections and provide an explanation for accepting or rejecting them

58. Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 316, 323–31, 343 (1996).
59. The elements of process review as described here have been developed most fully in the
context of notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) and have been shaped by
the requirements of that section of the APA. Nevertheless, the modern understanding of process
review in the rulemaking process is difficult to square with the language of § 553. See Am. Radio
Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Courts have incrementally expanded
those APA procedural requirements well beyond what the text [of § 553] provides.”). They are
commonly justified as a gloss on what is required by the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (noting that the arbitrary and capricious
standard requires an agency to articulate the rationale behind their decisions). That standard, in
turn, applies to all forms of reviewable agency action. Therefore, it is not much of a stretch to
regard the elements of process review, as described here, as being required before a court will
accept an agency interpretation of law adopted within the agency’s delegated space to interpret.
For decisions applying elements of process review to agency interpretations of law, see Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016), and Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581
(2009).
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will create the conditions for making these self-corrections, without
any direct intrusion by the reviewing court. The reviewing court need
only assure that the required decisional process has been followed; it
need not usurp the prerogative of the agency as the proper institution
to make discretionary interpretational choices.
Counterarguments against adopting process review are that it
would increase the costs of agency decisionmaking—called the
“ossification” problem in the context of rulemaking—and would
increase opportunities for judicial meddling in policy decisions
properly left to agency resolutions.60
As to cost, extending process review to agency statutory
interpretations would arguably be less burdensome than it is in the
context of pure policy choices made through rulemaking. Generally
speaking, empirical data or studies will not be that relevant to
questions of statutory interpretation, and objections and explanatory
responses to objections will focus on legal issues rather than complex
empirical claims and predictions. Also, to the extent the process-review
norm is already applicable to the policy aspect of an agency initiative,
extending it to a legal interpretation would add only marginally to the
burden on the agency.
As to judicial meddling, enforcing the process review norm would
undoubtedly create further opportunities for willful judicial behavior.
Some courts would trim their views about whether the agency has
complied with the norm in order to affirm an interpretation they like
or vacate one they dislike. The concern about the potential for willful
judicial behavior is present under virtually any conception of how
judicial review should operate. The relevant question is whether
adopting a norm of process review would increase the incidence of
willful behavior to an unacceptable degree relative to the benefits that
might be obtained from better agency interpretations. The answer is
obviously speculative. But it is plausible that requiring the agency to
consider material alternatives and objections, and give a cogent
explanation in response, would result, over the large run of cases, in
improved agency interpretations. Reasonable minds can differ about

60. For concerns about ossification in the context of rulemaking, see generally, for example,
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59 (1995). For evidence that judges use process review to advance their own policy
preferences, see generally, for example, Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
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whether extending process review to questions of statutory
interpretation would produce benefits that exceed its costs.
Regardless of how one comes out on that question, a secondary
benefit of extending process review to questions of statutory
interpretation returns to the earlier point about the desirability of
making changes in the law prospective. If acceptance of agency
interpretations turns on compliance with the process review norm, as
described, the natural way to comply would be to advance the
interpretation through substantive or interpretive rulemaking or a
declaratory order.61 Since these forms of administrative action are
nearly always prospective, the interpretation would be prospective as
well.
All of which suggests that the regime of judicial review should
include, as one of its elements, conditioning judicial acceptance of an
agency interpretation in a matter of discretionary interpretive choice
on the agency’s compliance with the process review norm. This
condition would create an incentive for agencies to observe the norm
and to resolve statutory interpretation questions prospectively.
E. The Four Values and the Chevron Doctrine
What this Article calls “the Chevron doctrine” refers to a
paragraph in Part II of Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion in Chevron,
which says that judicial review of agency legal interpretations always
entails two steps.62 The D.C. Circuit quickly treated this paragraph as
announcing a new standard of review, and that understanding
eventually appeared in various opinions by the Supreme Court, largely
due to the persistent advocacy of Justice Scalia.63 In its typical
formulation, the Chevron doctrine is a compound of two standards.
Step One asks whether the statute supplies a “clear” or “unambiguous”
answer to the precise question at issue. If yes, that answer must be
enforced by the reviewing court. If no, then the court asks, at Step Two,

61. For example, the agency interpretation in City of Arlington v. FCC was issued as a
declaratory order, which is a form of adjudication, but the FCC nevertheless solicited public
comment on its proposed interpretation before it entered the order, thereby complying with the
process-review norm. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 569
U.S. 290 (2013).
62. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
63. For the origins of the Chevron doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, see generally Gary Lawson
& Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an
Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253 (2014) [hereinafter Merrill, Story of Chevron].
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whether the agency interpretation is a “reasonable” or a “permissible”
answer to the question. If yes, then the court must accept the agency
interpretation. As formulated, the Chevron doctrine does a poor job of
advancing each of the four values highlighted here.
With respect to rule-of-law values, understood to mean promoting
stability of legal expectations, the problem with the two-step formula
is that it provides no obvious way to consider or enforce such values
unless they are reflected in an unambiguous text enacted by Congress.
Step One, which directs the court to engage in de novo review to
determine whether the statute has a clear meaning, provides no
occasion to consider whether the agency interpretation otherwise
frustrates settled expectations. Step Two, which asks if the agency
interpretation is reasonable, could conceivably be used to ask if the
agency interpretation reinforces or upsets settled expectations. But the
dominant understanding of Step Two has been to ask if the agency
interpretation is reasonable in light of judicial interpretational norms.64
As a result, assessing the agency interpretation against settled
expectations effectively drops out under the Chevron formula. The
relevance of a settled agency interpretation nevertheless persists in the
case law, because this is an important value long recognized by courts.
But its persistence occurs largely in the form of a random, ad hoc
consideration extraneous to the Chevron doctrine.65
With respect to constitutional values, most prominently the
separation of powers principle of legislative supremacy, Step One of
the Chevron doctrine correctly charges reviewing courts with enforcing
clear or unambiguous congressional directives. But the scope of an
agency’s delegated authority is often implicit in a series of legislative
enactments over time or becomes apparent only when considered in
light of established conventions about the role of different agencies or
the functions of the federal government as opposed to state and local
governments. These contextual understandings are ones that courts are
particularly well-suited to discern, but it is misleading to say they can
always be found in a “clear” or “unambiguous” text. Taken literally,
the Chevron doctrine seems to say that if Congress fails to spell out the
scope of an agency’s authority in unambiguous language, the agency
can exploit any gap, silence, or ambiguity in its organic act to expand

64.
65.

Barnett & Walker, supra note 54, at 1451–54.
See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823 (2015) (collecting decisions referring to the longevity of agency
interpretations after Chevron).
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or contract the scope of its authority in any way that passes muster as
a permissible interpretation. The principle of legislative supremacy
would inevitably devolve from the anti-inherency understanding to the
last-word conception.
One might think that, at the very least, the Chevron doctrine
would advance the idea that when a question of interpretation is really
a matter of discretionary policy choice, the agency interpretation
should prevail. Justice Stevens made plain in the concluding
paragraphs of his opinion that this was his understanding.66 The
Chevron doctrine, however, is a compound of two highly indeterminate
standards. How clear is clear? What exactly does it mean for an agency
interpretation to be reasonable? Given these indeterminacies, the
Chevron doctrine, in practice, is more realistically described as a
license for judicial willfulness. If a court dislikes an agency
interpretation that entails a policy choice, it can declare that the statute
“clearly” requires a different choice, or, more rarely, can declare that
the agency’s interpretation is “unreasonable.” Worse, because the twostep formula is highly streamlined compared to the eclectic doctrine
and elaborate investigations of legislative history that preceded it, the
Chevron doctrine actually reduces the cost of judicial willfulness,
inevitably increasing its incidence.
In terms of providing incentives for agencies to make better
interpretations, the Chevron doctrine also comes up short. The key
here is the ambiguity about what it means for an agency interpretation
to be reasonable. The Supreme Court could have interpreted this to
mean reasonable as a matter of the decisional process followed by the
agency, but it has not consistently done so. In other contexts, the Court
seems comfortable with the understanding that the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) requires reasoned decisionmaking when an
agency makes a pure policy decision, whether it be through
rulemaking, adjudication, or other informal agency action.67 But it has
failed to condition acceptance of agency interpretations of statutes on
66. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–66.
67. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910–
15 (2020) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the rescission of a policy statement
and faulting the agency for failing to consider alternatives and not addressing reliance interests);
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard to an internal memorandum written by the secretary of commerce and holding that it
advanced an explanation “incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities
and decisionmaking process”); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009)
(ruling that arbitrary and capricious review requires an explanation for a change in agency policy
adopted in an FCC adjudication).
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agency compliance with such a process. In particular, the Court has
applied the Chevron doctrine to interpretations announced in
adjudications when there has been no advance notice or opportunity
to comment on the interpretation before it is rendered.68
In short, the Chevron doctrine, as commonly understood by lower
courts and administrative law professors, fails to sufficiently advance
the four values of judicial review briefly adumbrated here. In order to
determine whether the Court can reformulate that doctrine to improve
on this score, the place to start is by re-reading the Chevron decision
itself.
II. THE CHEVRON OPINION: PARTS III–VII
The legal issue presented in Chevron was whether the EPA had
correctly interpreted the term “stationary source,” for purposes of the
nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act, to mean an entire plant
as opposed to a single apparatus like a smokestack.69 The term
stationary source first appeared in the 1970 version of the Act under
another program and included a definition that did not resolve whether
it referred to the entire plant or any apparatus in the plant.70 This
definition was not cross-referenced in the nonattainment program,
adopted in 1977.71 The D.C. Circuit rendered three decisions about the
meaning of “stationary source” under different Clean Air Act
programs and concluded that whether the term referred to the entire
plant or each apparatus depended on whether the purpose of the
provision was to improve or simply maintain existing air quality.72
Chevron is a long opinion, the body of it taking up twenty-seven
pages in the U.S. Reports, including forty-one footnotes.73 It is not
surprising that administrative law and legislation casebooks offer only
a highly abridged version of the opinion. In fact, most renditions of the

68. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (citing eight cases applying the
Chevron doctrine to an interpretation rendered in a formal adjudication); id. at 231 & n.13 (citing
Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–
57 (1995) as a case applying the Chevron doctrine to an informal adjudication in the form of a
letter of the comptroller of the currency granting the request of a national bank to act as an agent
selling annuities).
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
70. Id. at 846.
71. Id. at 859–60.
72. For further background about the decision, see Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63,
at 260–66.
73. Chevron, 468 U.S. at 837–66.
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decision reproduce the opening paragraphs of Part II and three
paragraphs near the end of Part VII (under the subheading “Policy”),
and they either summarize or offer extremely compressed versions of
everything in between.74 This is understandable, but unfortunate. If the
entire opinion is read from beginning to end, one discovers an
especially thorough, but generally conventional, exercise in judicial
review. Perhaps more surprisingly, the opinion can stand as the very
model of a decision that reflects the four values set forth in Part I as
critical in a regime of judicial review.
A. Rule-of-Law Values
Consider first, rule-of-law values. Congress can create settled
expectations when it legislates. The Chevron opinion reveals that
Justice Stevens looked hard for, and did not find, any settled
expectations created by Congress about the meaning of “stationary
source.” He meticulously examined the text of both the original Clean
Air Act provision dealing with stationary sources and the two later
programs dealing with them.75 He probed the legislative history,
looking for any evidence that the relevant committees or floor sponsors
of the 1977 amendments harbored any thoughts about the meaning of
“source.”76 He found no evidence of any legislative direction on this
point in either the text or the legislative history. Without such
legislative direction, the action of Congress itself could not have given
rise to legitimate expectations about the law on the part of either the
subjects or the beneficiaries of new source regulation by the EPA.
Chevron is often cited as a break with previous tradition regarding
the relevance of expectations created by agency action.77 The opinion
makes no mention of the established canons of interpretation giving
extra weight to agency interpretations that are contemporaneous with
the enactment of the statute or are longstanding and consistently
maintained by the agency.78 And in a section of the opinion addressing

74. E.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL, PETER M. SHANE, M. ELIZABETH
MAGILL, MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR & NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1002–07 (7th ed. 2014).
75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845–52, 859–62.
76. Id. at 862–64.
77. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (stating that after Chevron “there is no longer any justification for giving
‘special’ deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency interpretations of law”).
78. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908, 997–99 (2017).
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the respondents’ argument that the EPA was entitled to no deference
because it had changed its position about the meaning of stationary
source, Justice Stevens rejected this as a ground for overturning the
agency decision. As he wrote in a frequently quoted passage: “An
initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider
varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis.”79
A fair reading of the opinion’s larger discussion of this point,
however, suggests that Justice Stevens rejected the relevance of the
agency’s change in position because no settled expectation about the
definition of source had been established by the agency. To the contrary,
Justice Stevens made clear that the agency had consistently preferred
a “flexible” definition of “source.”80 It did a flip-flop between 1979 and
1980, but this was caused not by its own inconstancy, but by the
insistence of the D.C. Circuit that the statute had to be read “inflexibly
to command a plantwide definition for programs designed to maintain
clean air and to forbid such a definition for programs designed to
improve air quality.”81 In short, the change in agency position was due
to the activism of the politically divided D.C. Circuit, not the agency
itself. Justice Stevens was not rejecting the relevance of settled
expectations in judicial review of agency interpretations; he was
making the point that if there are no settled expectations, the agency
should be allowed to experiment with different interpretations that are
otherwise permissible.
B. Constitutional Values
Constitutional values also furnish no reason to fault the Chevron
decision. With respect to separation of powers values, the relevant
question is whether the EPA, in embracing the plant-wide
interpretation of “stationary source,” had exceeded the boundaries of
its authority established by Congress. The environmental groups that
had prevailed in the D.C. Circuit argued vigorously that Congress
intended “stationary source” to mean apparatus and therefore that the
EPA had exceeded the scope of its delegated authority. Justice
Stevens, in the body of the opinion, took this claim very seriously. He
carefully canvassed the relevant statutory provisions and found no
79.
80.
81.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64.
Id. at 856, 864.
Id. at 864.
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“specific definition of the term ‘stationary source,’” at least not in the
nonattainment provisions.82 There was a definition of “major”
stationary source, but it did not shed light in any clear fashion on the
meaning of “source.”83 Nor was there any discussion of the meaning of
“source” in the legislative history.84
Turning to the respondent’s specific arguments, Justice Stevens
noted that the 1970 Clean Air Act did contain a definition of
“stationary source,” and he thought it was possible that this definition
was intended to carry over to the same term under the nonattainment
program. That definition defined “source,” in part, to mean “building,”
and building “could be read to impose the permit conditions on an
individual building that is a part of a plant.”85 Justice Stevens then
noted that sometimes the meanings of words in a series are qualified
by an associated word in the series, and sometimes a word in a series is
understood to have “a character of its own,” which is not “submerged
by its association.”86 Justice Stevens implied that either of these
conflicting canons of construction could arguably be invoked in parsing
the definition in the original program, leaving the matter in equipoise.
Even assuming the second principle of construction was more relevant,
there was also the oddity that the definition of “major source” under
the nonattainment program equated “source” with “facility,” which
presumably has a broader meaning than “building.” He concluded:
“We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the
statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.”87
This discussion is highly relevant in understanding the role of a
reviewing court contemplated by the Chevron decision. Justice Stevens
did not rest with the absence of any specific definition of “source”
under the nonattainment program. Nor did he resolve the scope of the
agency’s authority with any casual characterization of the statute as
“unclear” or “ambiguous.” He carefully reviewed all the relevant
language, including that of a related provision in the 1970 Act, and

82. Id. at 851.
83. Id. at 851, 860.
84. Id. at 851–53.
85. Id. at 860.
86. Id.; see also id. at 860–61 (“[T]he meaning of a word must be ascertained in the context
of achieving particular objectives, and the words associated with it may indicate that the true
meaning of the series is to convey a common idea.”). See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). The second is more obscure, but Stevens cited Russell Motor Car Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923), as having adopted it.
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 861.
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concluded that Congress did not impose any relevant limit on the
meaning of “stationary source.” He was committed to determining,
through the exercise of de novo review, whether Congress had laid
down a boundary that limited the agency’s authority, or if, to the
contrary, Congress had left the agency with the space to make a
discretionary choice.88
C. Accountability Values
Chevron is justly famous for its emphatic affirmation of
accountability values. That affirmation occurred at the end of the
opinion, once Justice Stevens had established that Congress had no
“actual intent” about the meaning of “stationary source.” This meant
that the meaning of “stationary source” was a discretionary policy
choice that fell within a “gap left open by Congress.”89
Insofar as filling that gap involved a policy choice, Justice Stevens
made clear that it should be made by the agency, not the court.90 At the
end of his opinion, Justice Stevens advanced the critical argument why
courts should defer to agencies in matters of interpretation that entail
discretionary policy choices:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of Government . . . . In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.91

88. This reading is confirmed by an opinion filed by Justice Stevens seven years later in Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 222 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Dissenting from the majority’s
invocation of Chevron in upholding an agency regulation, he wrote:
The new regulations did not merely reflect a change in a policy determination that the
Secretary had been authorized by Congress to make. Cf. Chevron[, 467 U.S. at 865].
Rather, they represented an assumption of policymaking responsibility that Congress
had not delegated to the Secretary. See id., at 842–843.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859–60, 866.
90. Id. at 864.
91. Id. at 865–66.
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This famous passage is quoted in all excerpts of the decision. Note
carefully, however, that Justice Stevens qualifies the sphere of agency
policy choice by noting that Congress must have “delegated
policymaking responsibilities” to the agency, and the courts must defer
to the agency when it acts “within the limits of that delegation.” In
other words, there must be a delegation of authority to the agency, and
the agency’s sphere of superior accountability is limited by the scope
of the delegation. Consistent with the discussion of the four values in
Part I, the operative realm of the accountability value is subordinate to
the need to maintain the boundaries of agency discretion.
D. Process Values
The Chevron decision also includes statements that are consistent
with ideas sketched in Part I about how judicial review might improve
the quality of agency statutory interpretation decisions. Justice Stevens
noted that the plant-wide definition had been adopted by regulation,
and that, before it was adopted in 1981, “proposals for a plantwide
definition were considered in at least three formal proceedings.”92
After summarizing the earlier proceedings, Justice Stevens noted that
the EPA began by observing that the definitional issue was not
squarely addressed in either the statute or the legislative history and
therefore the issue involved an agency “judgment as [to] how to best
carry out the Act.”93 He then noted that the EPA had offered several
reasons for concluding that the plant-wide definition was more
appropriate.94 These conclusions, Justice Stevens observed, were set
forth in a proposed rulemaking in August 1981 that was formally
promulgated in October of that year.95
This description of the EPA’s process established that the Court
regarded the agency as having determined the meaning of “stationary
source” through a process that included full disclosure of the agency’s
reasoning to the public, an opportunity for any interested party to
comment, and to have—at least ordinarily—an agency response to any
material comments submitted.
The Court’s final characterization about the process followed by
the EPA in rendering its interpretation is also telling. Justice Stevens
concluded that the EPA’s interpretation “represents a reasonable
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 853.
Id. at 858 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (Mar. 12, 1981)).
Id. at 858–59.
Id.
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accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”96 Although this is
not a complete endorsement of the process-review model—adopted in
decisions like Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.97—it is fully consistent with, and may
presuppose the use of, that model.
In sum, if one were to take a pair of scissors and cut out the first
paragraphs of Part II of the opinion—and maybe one or two sentences
in the concluding section that seem to endorse the elimination of any
constraint on Congress’s power to delegate decisions to administrative
agencies—one would have an opinion that is almost entirely congruent
with the four values of judicial review set forth in Part I. The Justices,
and their law clerks, likely read the opinion this way, assuming they
plowed their way through the entire draft. Indeed, the Court as a whole
regarded the decision as an ordinary exercise in judicial review in the
initial period after it was decided.98 It was the D.C. Circuit, not the
Court, that decided Part II set forth a new standard of review
applicable to virtually all judicial challenges to agency statutory
interpretation decisions.99 Justice Scalia championed the D.C. Circuit’s
view once he joined the Court, and eventually “the Chevron
doctrine”—something materially different from the Chevron
decision—was born.
III. THE TWO PARAGRAPHS
If twenty-six out of twenty-seven pages in the Chevron decision
are consistent with the four values traced in Part I, where do the
paragraphs at the beginning of Part II of the Chevron opinion fit into
the picture? These are the paragraphs that are quoted or paraphrased

96. Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
97. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
98. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 981
(1992) (discussing the initial reception of Chevron by the Supreme Court).
99. The key cases are General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1566–67 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc) and Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 150–51 (D.C. Cir.
1984). Both decisions were authored by Chief Judge Patricia Wald and were decided roughly
three months after the Chevron decision was announced. For details about how the Chevron
doctrine got started in the D.C. Circuit and migrated back to the Supreme Court, see Lawson &
Kam, supra note 63, at 39–59 and Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 277–82.
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in casebooks and thousands of later decisions. They constitute what
came to be known as “the Chevron doctrine.”
A. The Problematic Aspects of Part II
The first of these two paragraphs sets forth the “two-step”
approach to agency interpretations of law. It is quoted here in its
entirety:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.100

There are two principal differences between this paragraph and
what Justice Stevens wrote in the balance of the opinion. First, the
paragraph asks whether Congress spoke directly to the “precise
question at issue,” whereas the balance of the opinion asks whether
Congress left the issue for the agency to determine. This is a subtle but
important difference. The “precise question” formulation seems to
charge the reviewing court with finding affirmative evidence of a
legislative intent in support of a specific interpretation. Such evidence
will be rare, and therefore the first paragraph seems to imply that the
agency in nearly all cases will have authority to render a dispositive
interpretation. The agency, in other words, is given a very large “space”
in which to interpret, subject only to small pockets where Congress has
prescribed an answer. In contrast, determining whether Congress left
the issue for the agency to decide is more consistent with a boundarymaintenance conception of the role of the reviewing court. This would
100. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). The footnotes omitted here proved to
be important. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987) (“The question
whether Congress intended the . . . standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory
construction for the courts to decide . . . . In Chevron . . . we explained: ‘The judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)).
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presumably result in a more confined “space” in which Congress has
left the agency free to act.
Second, the opening paragraph advances a rule-like conception of
the role of the reviewing court, expressed in terms of a sequential
inquiry—first Step One, then Step Two. The two-step sequence is rulelike only in the sense that it prescribes a certain ordering of inquiries.
The substance of the inquiries themselves is not rule-like at all. Rather,
they describe open-ended standards. The first step examines whether
Congress had a “clear” or “unambiguous” intent. Clear versus unclear
and unambiguous versus ambiguous prescribe very general standards
that require examination of statutory context. The second step asks
whether the agency interpretation is “permissible,” or as stated in the
following paragraph, “reasonable.” Permissible versus impermissible
or reasonable versus unreasonable are also general standards. What
the first paragraph actually seems to mandate, therefore, is a double
standard, both prongs of which are quite general.
That said, the form of the two-step structure is strikingly at odds
with the remainder of the opinion. If the opening paragraph was
intended to prescribe a general two-step decisional sequence, one
would expect to see this process mirrored in the analytical sections of
the opinion. Instead, the balance of the opinion proceeds in a much
more conventional fashion, carefully seeking to figure out what
Congress did and did not decide, and carefully reviewing the course of
the EPA’s struggle with the issue. Neither the rule-like articulation of
the sequencing of the decisional process, nor the formulation of the
steps in terms of clarity and permissibility—or ambiguity and
reasonableness—make an appearance in the body of the opinion, with
the exception of Justice Stevens’s conclusion that the EPA’s decision
to adopt the plant-wide definition was the product of a reasoned
decisionmaking process. So there is, again, an odd disconnect between
the first paragraph and the balance of the opinion.
The second paragraph has received less attention in subsequent
decisions and commentary. As a matter of jurisprudence, however, it
is more radical than the first. Again, it is important to quote the text:
“The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,
231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate
a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
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regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.101

The first three sentences in this paragraph are unproblematic. The
quotation from Morton v. Ruiz102 says that agencies must act to fill gaps
left in statutes, whether these gaps are left explicitly or implicitly.103
This is surely correct, although it says nothing about the standard of
review courts should apply in reviewing these gap-filling efforts—
something that was not at issue in Ruiz.104 The second sentence says
that Congress occasionally enacts an express delegation of authority
directing an agency to interpret a particular term in a statute, which is
true but unusual. The third says that in reviewing such an express
delegation for agency interpretation, courts have applied the arbitrary
and capricious standard, which is what the Court held in Batterton v.
Francis.105
More questionable are the fourth and fifth sentences. The fourth
seems to repeat the point from Ruiz about implicit gaps, but reframes
it in terms of implicit delegations to interpret, a characterization not
found in Ruiz. Then comes the final sentence, which seems to say that
courts should apply the same deferential standard of review to agency
interpretations of “implicit” delegations as they apply to explicit
delegations of authority to interpret specific terms. Admittedly, the last
sentence is not completely clear about this. Saying that courts may not
substitute their judgment for a “reasonable” agency interpretation is
not quite the same as saying that courts must uphold agency regulations
that are not arbitrary and capricious. But most courts and
commentators have read the last sentence as directing courts to apply

101. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (footnote omitted).
102. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
103. Id. at 231.
104. Ruiz was concerned with the merits of an agency interpretation and did not discuss the
standard of review:
We are confronted . . . with the issues whether the geographical limitation placed
on general assistance eligibility by the BIA is consistent with congressional intent and
the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, whether
the congressional appropriations are properly limited by the BIA’s restrictions, and, if
so, whether the limitation withstands constitutional analysis.
Id. at 209–10.
105. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–26 (1977).
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the same highly deferential standard to “implicit” delegations as they
apply to explicit delegations.106
Note carefully, however, that the fourth and fifth sentences do not
say Congress has implicitly delegated authority to an agency whenever
a statute is unclear or ambiguous. Lower courts and commentators
drew this conclusion by reading the description of the two steps in the
previous paragraph into the point about “implicit” delegations in the
second.107 But in fact, Justice Stevens says nothing about what sort of
evidence will suffice to establish that Congress has implicitly delegated
authority to an agency to interpret a particular provision in its organic
act.
Indeed, the interpretation of the second paragraph as endorsing
the idea that any ambiguity, gap, or silence constitutes an implicit
delegation of authority to the agency is hardly supported by the
balance of the opinion. If any ambiguity or lack of clarity constitutes
an implied delegation of authority to interpret, this would be
revolutionary. Vague statutory provisions are common. Silences about
issues that perhaps were not anticipated when the statute was adopted
are ubiquitous. Inconsistencies and internal tensions abound,
especially when statutes have been patched together from different
sources. Ordinary ambiguities are encountered routinely. All these
situations would qualify as implied delegations of interpretive
authority to an agency. The balance of the Chevron opinion makes no
such assumption. Instead, it proceeds on the understanding that the
definition of “stationary source” must be determined by a careful
investigation of the relevant text and legislative history of the Clean
Air Act, which yields the conclusion that the meaning of this term was
left undecided by Congress, requiring that it be particularized by the
agency.
The second paragraph would prove to have significance beyond
the revolutionary idea that any lack of clarity represents a delegation
of authority to the agency to interpret. It also contains the seeds of a
theory that would provide a legal justification for “the Chevron
doctrine”—that is, the interpretation of the first two paragraphs taken
out of context from the balance of the opinion. The legal justification
106. Indeed, the Court on several occasions has described Step Two of Chevron as requiring
application of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, which is what the Court said was
required when reviewing explicit delegations. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011);
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
107. E.g., Scalia, supra note 77, at 516.
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is that the strong deference seemingly mandated by the first two
paragraphs has been directed, if only “implicitly,” by Congress.
Proponents of this theory, such as Justice Scalia, admitted that any such
congressional intent is “fictional.”108 Indeed, it was wholly made up.
Congress has on multiple occasions sought to say the opposite—that
courts should exercise independent judgment in interpreting agency
statutes.109 And on one occasion—the enactment of the APA in 1946—
Congress succeeded in legislating this understanding explicitly.110
Chevron’s greatest weakness as a legal opinion is that it ignores
this aspect of the APA. However, if any ambiguity is an implicit
delegation of interpretive authority to agencies, then every time
Congress enacted an agency statute that contains an ambiguity after
1946, it impliedly amended the APA. The second paragraph thus
provided a theory for reconciling “the Chevron doctrine” with the
APA. It also gave rise to the most important attempt to rein in that
doctrine, in United States v. Mead Corp.111
B. Why Did Justice Stevens Start with the Two Paragraphs?
The question remains why Justice Stevens decided to launch his
lengthy opinion with these highly novel paragraphs. This is the ultimate
paradox of the Chevron decision. The opening paragraphs, which are
the font of “the Chevron doctrine” and are endlessly quoted or
paraphrased in thousands of decisions, do not appear to reflect the

108. As Justice Scalia acknowledged:
And to tell the truth, the quest for the “genuine” legislative intent is probably a wildgoose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress . . . didn’t think
about the matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in this field
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.
Id. at 517.
109. Prominent examples are the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, S. 909, 116th Cong.
§ 2(2)(B) (2019), which passed the House but not the Senate, and the Bumpers Amendment, S.
1080, 97th Cong. § 5 (1981), which came close to enactment in the years before Chevron, 128
Cong. Rec. 5297, 5302 (1982).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). Section 706 begins by stating that a “reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” Id. On its face, this seems
unequivocally to instruct courts to apply independent judgment on all questions of law. A
subsection of § 706 says that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” Id. § 706(2)(C). There
is ample evidence that Congress prefers that ambiguities be resolved by its faithful agent—the
courts—rather than by agencies subject to greater influence by its great institutional rival—the
executive.
111. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).

MERRILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

RE-READING CHEVRON

1/19/2021 5:10 PM

1189

standard of review that Justice Stevens actually applied in the decision
itself. If courts are always supposed to engage in review using the
notions advanced in the opening paragraphs, one would surely expect
these ideas to form the foundation for the analysis in the balance of the
opinion. Instead, after their appearance in Part II, they effectively
disappear.
Although this is necessarily conjectural, Justice Stevens most
likely authored Part II after he completed the remainder of the opinion.
The best evidence of this is the very lack of integration in the opinion
between Part II and the balance of the discussion. If Justice Stevens
began by drafting the opening paragraphs, with the two-step decisional
sequence and so forth, one would expect him to apply similar concepts
in the balance of the opinion. Instead, the opinion contains the multiple
disconnects previously discussed.
In addition, Justice Stevens is known to have followed a practice
of dictating first drafts of his opinions.112 And the balance of the
opinion reflects this. After the opening paragraphs, the decision reads
like someone proceeding through familiar steps of statutory analysis
and recording as he went along. Part III describes the history of the
Clean Air Act and the features of the Act that led to the adoption of
the new source review provisions. Part IV discusses the historical
evolution of the 1977 amendments to the Act. Part V describes the
internal legislative history of the 1977 amendments insofar as it touches
on the new source provisions of the nonattainment program. Part VI
addresses the EPA’s multiple efforts over time to define the meaning
of “stationary source.” Part VII—the concluding portion of the
opinion—considers and rejects the respondents’ specific arguments in
opposition to the plant-wide definition, based on statutory language,
legislative history, and policy. One can almost picture Justice Stevens
at his desk, patiently poring through different piles of relevant
material, and dictating his conclusions after he completed his review of
each pile.
Indeed, Justice Harry Blackmun’s notes indicate that at
conference Justice Stevens said he was “not at rest.”113 Justice Stevens
had not fully settled on the right answer or approach to the case when
he was assigned to write the opinion for the Court. For a careful and
diligent judge like Justice Stevens, the logical thing to do when not at
112. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html [https://perma.cc/MD3Y-MRUZ].
113. Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 272.
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rest would be to unravel the pieces of the puzzle, bit by bit, until the
answer became clear. This surmise is reinforced by two memos Justice
Stevens wrote to Justice William Brennan after the initial conference
vote in the case. Justice Brennan, who voted to affirm the D.C. Circuit
at conference, was hoping that Justice Stevens would adopt an
approach that would eliminate any need for a dissent in the case. In his
first response to Justice Brennan, written on March 6, 1984, Justice
Stevens wrote: “At this point I really am not far enough into the case
to give you a definitive answer, but I certainly will do my best to
prepare an opinion that will achieve as broad a consensus as
possible.”114 In the second memo, dated May 23, 1984, Justice Stevens
wrote:
At long last I have found the time to get back into these cases and
to begin work on a draft opinion. Since you wrote to me on March 6,
in the hope that you might be able to escape the chore of writing a
dissenting opinion if I could see my way clear to accepting your
approach to the case, I thought I should let you know that I am now
quite firmly persuaded that the Government is correct in arguing that
the EPA’s interpretation of the term “source” is permissible.115

This correspondence confirms that Stevens moved from doubt to
certainty about the proper outcome as he worked his way through the
complex materials. The public evidence that he followed such a process
is found in Parts III–VII of the opinion, which therefore had to be
drafted first.
If this conjecture is correct, why then would Justice Stevens, after
drafting the longest portion of the opinion, turn back and draft the
short introductory passages that make up Part II? The best explanation
for this may be the precarious situation in which Justice Stevens found
himself. Because of recusals, only six Justices were still in the case,116
two of whom had voted to affirm; the other three, aside from Stevens
himself, had all indicated varying degrees of uncertainty about the right
outcome.117 Justice Stevens had convinced himself of the right
114. Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. 16 (Mar. 6, 1984), http://supremecourt
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-1005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF7F-7DQB].
115. Letter from John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct., to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., Assoc. J. of the U.S. Sup. Ct. 17 (May 23, 1984), http://supremecourt
opinions.wustl.edu/files/opinion_pdfs/1983/82-1005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF7F-7DQB].
116. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
117. Merrill, Story of Chevron, supra note 63, at 273. Justices William Rehnquist and
Thurgood Marshall were recused for health reasons, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was
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outcome, but the written evidence of the steps leading to this
confidence took up some twenty pages in the slip opinion, and required
attending to a highly technical set of statutory provisions, a convoluted
administrative history, and an esoteric policy debate. What was needed
was some arresting language that would grab the reader’s attention and
suggest that the outcome was compelled by first principles.
Reduced to their essence, the first two paragraphs are a strong
invocation, albeit expressed in a novel way, of the distinction between
law and policy. Courts concern themselves only with enforcing the law;
policy is for politically accountable institutions like legislatures and
agencies. The sharp distinction between law and policy resonates
strongly with lawyers and judges. Justice Stevens, by raising the
distinction early in the opinion, and concluding with it again at the end,
was attempting to condition the reader to accept his ultimate
conclusion: that the definition of stationary source was a policy
question, not a legal one, and hence one in which the view of the
administrative agency should be accepted.
In short, Justice Stevens turned to drafting what became Part II in
an effort to condense the result of a conventional process of reasoning
into a set of precepts unconventional enough for readers to sit up and
take note. In his own mind, Justice Stevens probably saw no
contradiction between Part II and the balance of the opinion.
However, by reducing the complexity of his effort to a rule-like
framework, and invoking a problematic equation of implicit gaps and
delegations to interpret, Justice Stevens inadvertently produced
language that could be used by later courts to create something very
different—something with which Justice Stevens, for one, was deeply
uncomfortable.118
IV. RE-WRITING THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
Parts II and III of this Article present a re-reading of the Chevron
decision, and that re-reading provides the foundation for a possible re-

recused because of a financial interest in one of the parties. Id. This left only Chief Justice Warren
Burger and Justices William Brennan, Byron White, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, and John
Paul Stevens participating.
118. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (Stevens, J.) (declining to give
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation about the preemptive effect of a federal statute);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Stevens, J.) (declining to apply Chevron to a “pure
question of law”).
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writing of the Chevron doctrine, without any need to overrule the
decision. Such a re-writing should entail the following central points.
The paragraphs of Part II of the Chevron decision must be read in
the context of the opinion as a whole. When so read, Part II establishes
two critical propositions, which are sound and should be reaffirmed:
1. If a reviewing court determines, using the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, that a statute has a clear or
unambiguous meaning, that meaning must be enforced,
notwithstanding any agency interpretation to the contrary.
This understanding is required by rule-of-law values and by
the separation of powers principle of legislative supremacy.
2. If a reviewing court determines, using the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, that Congress has expressly or
impliedly delegated authority to the agency to fill a gap or
space in the statute, the agency interpretation should be
reviewed in a manner similar to the way courts review agency
policy determinations more generally under the arbitrary and
capricious standard of the APA. This is required by
understanding that the agency, because of its political
accountability and expertise, is the preferred institution for
resolving questions of discretionary policy.
The balance of the Chevron decision, found in Parts III–VII,
either establishes or is consistent with the following propositions:
3. The Chevron decision did not hold that settled expectations
created by prior agency action are irrelevant in reviewing an
agency’s exercise of interpretative authority. The Court found
that prior legislative and administrative action had not created
any settled expectations. Many decisions before and after
Chevron reaffirm that settled expectations created by
contemporary or longstanding agency understanding of its
statutory mandate are relevant in reviewing agency
interpretations of law. Giving weight to such expectations is
required by rule-of-law values.
4. In speaking of implied delegations of interpretative authority,
the Court did not suggest that any silence, gap, or ambiguity
in a statute automatically constitutes a delegation of
interpretive authority to the agency. The reviewing court must
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determine, as a matter of independent judgment using the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether Congress
has left space for the agency to fill in the exercise of delegated
authority. Only after determining that the best reading of the
statute is that Congress actually intended the agency to
exercise discretionary interpretive authority should the
reviewing court accept the agency’s interpretation. This is
required by constitutional values—most prominently, the antiinherency understanding of the principle of legislative
supremacy.
5. When a reviewing court concludes that the agency
interpretation is consistent with settled expectations and falls
within the delegated space created by Congress where the
agency is to exercise interpretive authority, the agency
interpretation should be reviewed like other exercises of
delegated policymaking authority. This is required by
considerations of comparative institutional analysis—namely,
that the agency is a superior institution for establishing policy
on grounds of political accountability and expertise.
6. A critical element in exercising the review of such
discretionary agency interpretations, as is required for any
exercise of review if an agency has discretionary policymaking
authority, is whether the agency developed its position
through a process of reasoned decisionmaking. Typically, this
entails providing notice, an opportunity to object, and an
explanation by the agency for rejecting any plausible
alternatives or objections deemed significant.
This does not exhaust the elements the Court should draw upon
in re-writing the Chevron doctrine. As in Kisor v. Wilkie,119 where the
Court re-wrote the Auer doctrine,120 the Court should draw from
additional elements as well.

119. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
120. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1945). Auer required that courts give “controlling”
weight to an agency interpretation of their own regulations unless it is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). Kisor declined to overrule Auer, but recognized six
qualifications to its standard of review, most of which were drawn from prior precedent. Kisor,
139 S. Ct. at 2415–18.
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The APA, which was ignored in Chevron and in most of the later
cases invoking the Chevron doctrine, provides powerful support for
this re-writing. As Professor Henry Monaghan explained years ago,
deferring to agency interpretations of law when Congress actually
intends that the agency should serve as the primary interpreter is fully
consistent with the Act’s general instruction to courts to “decide all
relevant questions of law.”121 By deferring to the agency interpretation,
the court is following the law. But it is inconsistent with the APA to
defer to the agency regarding the scope of its own authority. The APA
instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is
“in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.”122 As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, in dissent, in
City of Arlington v. FCC123:
Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when and because
Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive authority over the
question at issue. An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority
until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys that authority
must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.124

The APA requires this much. The discovery, if belated, of a conflict
between judge-made doctrine and a controlling statute fully justifies
making appropriate qualifications to the doctrine.
The Court can also draw on aspects of its Chevron jurisprudence,
such as the decisions that continue to emphasize the importance of
longstanding and consistent agency interpretations,125 the decisions
that interpret Mead as requiring an all-things-considered inquiry into
whether Congress actually intended the agency to exercise delegated
interpretive authority,126 and the decisions that decline to apply the
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018); see Henry Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1983).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
123. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
124. Id. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125. See generally Krishnakumar, supra note 65 (collecting decisions referencing the duration
of an agency interpretation in considering whether deference is appropriate).
126. See Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). Although Mead instructed that the Chevron doctrine should
apply only when an agency had made its interpretation pursuant to delegated authority to act with
the force of law, United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001), this is inadequate to
ensure that the agency is acting within the scope of its delegated authority. The question of agency
authority exists along two dimensions. One is whether Congress has given the agency the
authority to act with the force of law. The other is whether Congress has given the agency the
authority to decide the particular question presented. It is quite possible to imagine an agency
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Chevron doctrine where the agency has failed to follow a reasoned
decisionmaking process.127
In short, it is well within the capacities of the Justices to reform
the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. They
can do so by emphasizing the analysis set forth in the body of the
Chevron opinion, by emphasizing the importance of the judicial-review
provisions of the APA, and by drawing upon qualifications introduced
in post-Chevron decisions.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advanced one simple idea about how to revise the
Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. Ignoring
the provocative paragraphs in Part II of the decision and concentrating
instead on the balance of the opinion, the Chevron decision is highly
consistent with four important values that should inform judicial
review of agency interpretations of law. Those are rule-of-law values,
constitutional values including the principle of legislative supremacy,
the desirability of accepting agency decisions that reflect discretionary
policy choices, and the importance of reasoned decisionmaking by
agencies. While the body of the Chevron opinion reflects these values
well, the Chevron doctrine, which was created by reading two
introductory paragraphs of the opinion out of context, reflects these
values poorly. The first step to reform the Chevron doctrine is to reread the Chevron decision, concentrating on the body of the opinion

that is given authority to act with the force of law (for example, to issue binding regulations
governing the marketing of drugs and medical devices) but is not given authority over a particular
set of issues (for example, to regulate tobacco products). See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000). Conversely, it is possible to imagine an agency that is
given authority over a particular set of issues (for example, to make sure employees get paid time
and a half for overtime) but not given authority to act with the force of law with respect to those
issues (for example, to bring an enforcement action before the agency when a violation is
suspected). See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). The principle of legislative
supremacy requires that both types of limits be enforced.
127. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125–26 (2016) (refusing to
give Chevron deference to an agency interpretation that failed to explain its departure from
previous interpretations); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (refusing to apply the
Chevron doctrine in part because the agency had not provided any notice of its interpretation
before it was adopted). For recent decisions applying a robust version of the reasoned
decisionmaking norm, see Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910–15 (2020) (invalidating the rescission of a policy statement for
failure to consider alternatives), and Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–
76 (2019) (invalidating an order from the secretary of commerce based on a finding that his stated
rationale was “pretextual”).
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and interpreting the paragraphs setting forth the two-step approach in
light of that analysis. Starting with this foundation, the process of
articulating a better deference doctrine should be attainable.

